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ON PRICING RULES AND OPTIMAL STRATEGIES IN GENERAL
KYLE-BACK MODELS
UMUT C¸ETIN AND ALBINA DANILOVA
Abstract. The folk result in Kyle-Back models states that the value function of the insider
remains unchanged when her admissible strategies are restricted to absolutely continuous
ones. In this paper we show that, for a large class of pricing rules used in current litera-
ture, the value function of the insider can be finite when her strategies are restricted to be
absolutely continuous and infinite when this restriction is not imposed. This implies that
the folk result doesn’t hold for those pricing rules and that they are not consistent with
equilibrium. We derive the necessary conditions for a pricing rule to be consistent with
equilibrium and prove that, when a pricing rule satisfies these necessary conditions, the
insider’s optimal strategy is absolutely continuous, thus obtaining the classical result in a
more general setting.
This, furthermore, allows us to justify the standard assumption of absolute continuity of
insider’s strategies since one can construct a pricing rule satisfying the necessary conditions
derived in the paper that yield the same price process as the pricing rules employed in the
modern literature when insider’s strategies are absolutely continuous.
1. Introduction
The canonical model of markets with asymmetric information is due to Kyle [17], where
he studies a market for a single risky asset whose price is determined in equilibrium. Kyle’s
model is set up in discrete time and it has been extended to a continuous time framework
by Back [1] and is commonly referred to as a Kyle-Back model in subsequent literature. In
this type of models there are typically three types of agents participating in the market:
non-strategic noise traders, a strategic risk-neutral informed trader (insider) with private
information regarding the future value of the asset, and a number of risk-neutral market
makers competing for the total demand. The goal of market makers is to set the pricing
rule so that the resulting price is rational, which in particular entails finite expected profit
for the insider trading at these prices. On the other hand, the objective of the insider is to
maximise her expected final wealth given the pricing rule set by the market makers. Thus,
this type of modelling can be viewed as a game with asymmetric information between the
market makers and the insider and the goal is to find an equilibrium of this game.
Apart from extending the Kyle’s model to continuous time the most important contribu-
tion of Back [1] was to establish that, when the market maker sets the price to be a harmonic
function of total order, the insider’s value function is finite and the optimal control solving
the insider’s optimisation problem is absolutely continuous. This implies that the set of ad-
missible controls of the insider can be reduced to absolutely continuous ones. This restriction
significantly simplifies the problem of finding an equilibrium since it allows one to employ a
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PDE approach to the insider’s optimal control problem that yields a system of PDEs that
the value function of the insider and the pricing rule of the market maker have to satisfy in
equilibrium.
Back’s result was the original justification for restricting the set of admissible controls
of the insider to absolutely continuous ones and this restriction is now standard in the
asymmetric information literature (see, e.g., [2], [10], [11], [5], [8], [13], [12], and [18]). In
this paper we show that if we extend the class of pricing rules beyond harmonic functions
of total order to include ones used in the recent literature, e.g. in the papers cited above,
then the value function of the insider is infinite and her optimal control is not absolutely
continuous. In particular, this is true for the pricing rules in the aforementioned papers.
Since the value function of the insider is infinite, those pricing rules can not be equilibrium
pricing rules.
However, since the infinite profit is due to penalty imposed on discontinuous strategies
or strategies with additional martingale part being insufficient to offset the profit made
due to private information, one can modify this penalty to ensure optimality of absolutely
continuous strategies, while warranting the same price process when insider’s strategy is
absolutely continuous. This is precisely what we do in this paper by establishing a class of
pricing rules that yield the same price process as the models cited before when the trading
strategy of the insider is absolutely continuous but produce a finite value for the insider
when her strategies are allowed to have jumps or martingale parts. We show that for this
class of pricing rules the set of admissible controls of the insider can be reduced to absolutely
continuous ones.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first one to identify this class of pricing rules
consistent with an equilibrium. Moreover, it is also the first one since [1] that justifies the
restriction of insider’s controls to absolutely continuous ones in a general setting. In this it
closes the gap between the assumption of absolutely continuous controls and its justification
in the modern literature that employs more general pricing rules.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model and introduce the
set of pricing rules that generalise the pricing rules employed in the current literature. In
Section 3 we analyse the optimisation problem of the insider and establish a subset of these
pricing rules that yield a finite value to this problem. In particular, Theorem 3.2 derives
the necessary conditions on the pricing rule that ensure that the insider cannot achieve
infinite profits by employing discontinuous strategies and/or strategies with a martingale
part. Theorem 3.4 establishes a PDE condition on the pricing rule that is necessary for
the existence of equilibrium. In Section 4 we demonstrate that, under the conditions for
the pricing rule derived in Section 3, the restriction of admissible controls to absolutely
continuous ones produces the same value function. Moreover, as a by-product we obtain the
familiar sufficient conditions on the pricing rule and the trading strategy in order for the
equilibrium to exist.
2. Model setup
As in [1] we will assume that the trading will take place over the time interval [0, 1]. Let
(Ω,G, (Gt)t∈[0,1],Q) be a filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions, The time-1
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value of the traded asset is given by f(Z1), which will become public knowledge at t = 1 to
all market participants, where Z is a continuous and adapted process, and f is a measurable
increasing function.
Three types of agents trade in the market. They differ in their information sets and
objectives as follows.
• Noise/liquidity traders trade for liquidity reasons, and their total demand at time t
is given by a standard (Gt)-Brownian motion B independent of Z.
• Market makers only observe the total demand
Y = θ +B,
where θ is the demand process of the informed trader. The admissibility condition
imposed later on θ will entail in particular that Y is a semimartingale.
They set the price of the risky asset via a Bertrand competition and clear the
market. Similar to [2] we assume that the market makers set the price as a function of
weighted total order process at time t, i.e. we consider pricing functionals S
(
Y[0,t], t
)
of the following form
S
(
Y[0,t], t
)
= H (t, Xt) , ∀t ∈ [0, 1) (2.1)
where X is adapted to the filtration generated by B and Z and is the unique strong
solution of a certain SDE whose coefficients and drivers are constructed by the market
makers as made precise in Definition 2.1. Moreover, a pricing rule has to be admissible
in the sense of Definition 2.1, which will entail S being a semimartingale.
• The informed investor observes the price process St = H (t, Xt) and her private signal
Z. Since she is risk-neutral, her objective is to maximize the expected final wealth,
i.e.
sup
θ∈A
E0,z
[
W θ1
]
, where (2.2)
W θ1 = (f(Z1)− S1−)θ1− +
∫ 1−
0
θs−dSs. (2.3)
In above A is the set of admissible trading strategies for the given pricing rule1
observable by the insider, which will be defined in Definition 2.2. Moreover, E0,z is
the expectation with respect to P 0,z, which is the regular conditional distribution of
(Xs, Zs; s ≤ 1) given X0 = 0 and Z0 = z, which exists due to Theorem 44.3 in [4].
Thus, the insider maximises the expected value of her final wealth W θ1 , where the
first term on the right hand side of equation (2.2) is the contribution to the final
wealth due to a potential differential between the market price and the fundamental
value at the time of information release, and the second term is the contribution to
the final wealth coming from the trading activity.
Given the above market structure, we can now precisely define the filtrations of the market
makers and of the informed trader. As we shall require them to satisfy the usual conditions,
we first define the probability measures that will be used in the completion of their filtrations.
1Note that this implies the insider’s optimal trading strategy takes into account the feedback effect, i.e.
that prices react to her trading strategy.
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First define F := σ(Bt, Zt; t ≤ 1) and let Q0,z be the regular conditional distribution of
(B,Z) given B0 = 0 and Z0 = z. Observe that any P
0,z-null set is also Q0,z-null in view of
the assumption on X . Due to the measurability of regular conditional distributions one can
define the probability measure P on (Ω,F) by
P(E) =
∫
R
Q0,z(E)Q(Z0 ∈ dz), (2.4)
for any E ∈ F .
WhileQ0,z is how the informed trader assign likelihood to the events generated by B and Z,
P is the probability distribution of the market makers who do not observe Z0 exactly. Thus,
the market makers’ filtration, denoted by FM , will be the right-continuous augmentation
with the P-null sets of the filtration generated by Y . In particular FM satisfies the usual
conditions.
On the other hand, since the informed trader knows the value of Z0 perfectly, it is plausible
to assume that her filtration is augmented with the Q0,z-null sets. However, this will make
the modelling cumbersome since the filtration will have an extra dependence on the value
of Z0 purely for technical reasons. Another natural choice is to consider the null sets that
belong to every Q0,z, i.e. the sets that are elements of the following
N I := {E ⊂ F : Q0,z(E) = 0, ∀z ∈ R}. (2.5)
These null sets will correspond to the a priori beliefs that the informed trader has about
the model before she is given the private information about Z0 and, thus, can be used as a
good benchmark for comparison. Therefore we assume that the informed trader’s filtration,
denoted by F I , is the right continuous augmentation of the filtration generated by S and Z
with the sets of N I . Note that the resulting filtration is not complete.
We are finally in a position to give a rigorous definition of the rational expectations equi-
librium of this market, i.e. a pair consisting of an admissible pricing rule and an admissible
trading strategy such that: a) given the pricing rule the trading strategy is optimal, b) given
the trading strategy, the pricing rule is rational in the following sense:
H(t, Xt) = St = E
[
f(Z1)|FMt
]
, (2.6)
where E corresponds to the expectation operator under P. To formalize this definition of
equilibrium, we first define the sets of admissible pricing rules and trading strategies.
Definition 2.1. An admissible pricing rule is any pair (H,w, c, j) fulfilling the following
conditions:
(1) w : [0, 1]× R→ (0,∞) is a function in C1,2([0, 1]× R);
(2) Given a Brownian motion, β, on some filtered probability space, there exists a unique
strong solution to
dX˜t = w(t, X˜t)dβt, X˜0 = 0.
(3) H ∈ C1,2([0, 1)× R).
(4) x 7→ H(t, x) is strictly increasing for every t ∈ [0, 1);
(5) c : [0, 1]× R→ R is locally Lipschitz;
(6) j : [0, 1]× R× R→ R is continuous.
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Suppose that (H,w, c, j) is an admissible pricing rule and the market makers face the total
demand, Y = B+ θ, where θ is an admissible trading strategy in the sense of Definition 2.2.
Then the price set by the market makers is St = H(t, Xt), where X is the unique strong
solution2 of
dXt = w(t, Xt−)dY
c
t + dCt + Jt, X0 = 0, (2.7)
over the time interval [0, 1] on (Ω,F , (FMt ),P). In above
dCt =
(wx(t, Xt−)
2
+ c(t, Xt−)
)
w(t, Xt−)(d[Y, Y ]
c
t − dt),
Jt = K
−1
w (t, j(t, Xt−,∆Yt) +Kw(t, Xt−) + ∆Yt)−Xt−, and
Kw(t, x) =
∫ x
0
1
w(t, y)
dy +
1
2
∫ t
0
wx(s, 0)ds. (2.8)
Note that in view of Definition 2.1 the set of admissible θ for which there exists a strong
solution to (2.7) is not empty.
Moreover, if θ is absolutely continuous, dXt = w(t, Xt)dYt and the price set by the market
makers agrees with the one set in the standard literature. That is, the choice of c and j
does not affect the market price if the insider’s trading strategy is restricted to be absolutely
continuous. This implies that (2.7) defines a set of pricing rules for general strategies of the
insider that are consistent with the ones used in the literature under the assumption that the
insider is only allowed to follow absolutely continuous strategies. Thus, if one can identify
the functions c and j for which the optimal strategy of the insider is absolutely continuous,
one recovers the equilibria obtained in the previous studies with the modification of the
pricing rule given by those c and j.
Remark 2.1. Observe that the existence of a unique strong solution in Definition 2.1 implies
min{P(Kw(t, X˜t) > y),P(Kw(t, X˜t) < −y)} > 0. In particular Kw(t, ·) : R → R is onto for
every t ∈ [0, 1].
Indeed, P(Kw(t, X˜t) > y) ≥ P(Kw(t, X˜t) > y, sups≤t |X˜s| ≤ n) for some large enough n.
On the other hand, application of Ito’s formula yields
K(t, X˜t) = βt −
∫ t
0
G(s, X˜s)ds,
where G(t, x) =
∫ x
0
g(t, y)dy and g(t, x) := wt(t,x)
w2(t,x)
+ 1
2
wxx(t, x) are continuous.
Thus, the law of K(t ∧ τn, X˜t∧τn)t∈[0,1] is equivalent to that of (βt∧νn)t∈[0,1], where τn =
inf{t ≥ 0 : |X˜t| ≥ n} and νn = {t ≥ 0 : |K−1w (t, βt)| ≥ n} by Girsanov’s theorem. There-
fore, P(Kw(t, X˜t) > y, sups≤t |X˜s| ≤ n) > 0 yielding the claim. Similarly, P(Kw(t, X˜t) <
−y, sups≤t |X˜s| ≤ n) > 0. Consequently, min{P(X˜t > x),P(X˜t < −x)} > 0 for all t ∈ [0, 1]
by choosing y = K(t, x).
Remark 2.2. The strict monotonicity of H in the space variable implies H is invertible
prior to time 1, thus, the filtration of the insider is generated by X and Z. Note that jumps
2Following Kurtz [16] X is a strong solution of (2.7) if there exists a measurable mapping, ϕ, such that
X := ϕ(Y ) satisfies (2.7). Note that Y may jump only due to the discontinuities in θ.
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of Y can be inferred from the jumps of X via (2.7) and the form of J . Moreover, since
Kw ∈ C1,2 under the hypothesis on w, an application of Ito’s formula yields
dKw(t, Xt) = dY
c
t −
1
2
wx(t, Xt−)dt+Kw(t, Xt)−Kw(t, Xt−) + ∂
∂t
Kw(t, Xt−)dt.
Thus, one can also obtain the dynamics of Y c by observing X. Hence, the natural filtrations
of X and Y coincide. This in turn implies that (FS,Zt ) = (FB,Zt ), i.e. the insider has full
information about the market.
In view of the above one can take F It = FB,Zt for all t ∈ [0, 1].
Definition 2.2. An FB,Z-adapted θ is said to be an admissible trading strategy for a given
pricing rule (H,w, c, j) if
(1) θ is a semimartingale3 on (Ω,F , (FB,Zt ), Q0,z) for each z ∈ R;
(2) There exists a unique strong solution, X, to (2.7) over the time interval [0, 1] on
(Ω,F , (FB,Zt ),P), where Y = B + θ;
(3) and no doubling strategies are allowed, i.e. for all z ∈ R
E0,z
[∫ 1
0
H2 (t, Xt) dt
]
<∞. (2.9)
The set of admissible trading strategies for the given pricing rule (H,w, c, j) is denoted
with A(H,w, c, j). For the notational brevity, we will also denote by A(H,w) :=
A(H,w, 0, 0).
Remark 2.3. Observe that the jumps of θ are summable since θ is a semimartingale in a
Brownian filtration and, thus, the local martingale in its decomposition is continuous. This
in particular implies that that Y is a semimartingale with summable jumps and the price
process is well-defined.
Now we can formally define the market equilibrium as follows.
Definition 2.3. A couple ((H∗, w∗, c∗, j∗), θ∗) is said to form an equilibrium if (H∗, w∗, c∗, j∗)
is an admissible pricing rule, θ∗ ∈ A(H∗, w∗, c∗, j∗)), and the following conditions are satis-
fied:
(1) Market efficiency condition: given θ∗, (H∗, w∗, c∗, j∗) is a rational pricing rule, i.e.
it satisfies (2.6).
(2) Insider optimality condition: given (H∗, w∗, c∗, j∗), θ∗ solves the insider optimization
problem for all z:
E0,z[W θ
∗
1 ] = sup
θ∈A(H∗,w∗,c∗,j∗)
E0,z[W θ1 ] <∞.
The above setup uses the standard definition of equilibirum as in Back [1]. The difference
lies in the generalisation of the set of admissible pricing rules that in particular includes
the ones used in the current literature (see, e.g., [2], [10], [11], [5], [8], [13], [12], and [18]).
Moreover, the signal of the insider is not assumed to be Markovian contrary to the common
assumption.
3Note that due to the incompleteness of the stochastic basis we follow the notion of semimartingale from
Jacod and Shiryaev [15] that only requires the right-continuity of filtrations.
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3. On equilibrium pricing rule
In this section we will show that (2.7) is a necessary condition for the pricing rule to be
compatible with the equilibrium, since any other choice of market maker’s weighting of the
signal will result in the infinite profit for the insider.
In what follows we will assume that H and w satisfy
wt(t, x) +
w2(t, x)
2
wxx(t, x) = w
2(t, x)g(t, x), (3.1)
Ht(t, x) +
1
2
w2(t, x)Hxx(t, x) = 0, (3.2)
where g is a continuous function. These PDEs (with g ≡ 0) can be obtained via a formal
derivation of HJB equations associated with the insider optimisation problem as in [5] and
[9].
We will demonstrate that w must satisfy (3.1) with g ≡ 0 for the equilibrium to exist4.
The next theorem computes the expected final wealth of the insider in our general setup.
We will use this representation to solve the optimisation problem for the insider. In particular
this representation will provide an upper bound on the value function when g vanishes and
the trading strategies are continuous.
Theorem 3.1. Let (H,w, c, j) be an admissible pricing rule such that H satisfies (3.2) and
w solves (3.1), where g is a continuous function on [0, 1] × R. Assume θ ∈ A(H,w, c, j).
Then
E0,z
[
W θ1
]
= E0,z
[
Ψf(Z1)(0, 0)−Ψf(Z1)(1−, X1−)− 1
2
∫ 1−
0
w(t, Xt−)Hx(t, Xt−)d[θ, θ]
c
t
+
∫ 1−
0
(H(t, Xt−)− a) c(t, Xt−)(d[Y, Y ]ct − dt)−
∫ 1−
0
∫ Xt−
ξ(t,a)
(H(t, u)− a)g(t, u)dudt
+
∑
0<t<1
{
Ψf(Z1)(t, Xt)−Ψf(Z1)(t, Xt−)− (H(t, Xt)− f(Z1))∆θt
}]
,
where
Ψa(t, x) :=
∫ x
ξ(t,a)
H(t, u)− a
w(t, u)
du+
1
2
∫ 1
t
Hx(s, ξ(s, a))w(s, ξ(s, a))ds (3.3)
and ξ(t, a) is the unique solution of H(t, ξ(t, a)) = a.
Moreover,
∆Ψa(t, Xt)− (H(t, Xt)− a)∆θt ≤ (H(t, Xt)− a)j(t, Xt−,∆Yt)
∆Ψa(t, Xt)− (H(t, Xt)− a)∆θt ≥ (H(t, Xt−)− a)j(t, Xt−,∆Yt)−∆H(t, Xt)∆θt. (3.4)
Proof. Using Ito’s formula for general semimartingales (see, e.g. Theorem II.32 in [19]) we
obtain
dH(t, Xt) = Hx(t, Xt−)w(t, Xt−)dY
c
t + dFVt,
4If the equilibrium is inconspicuous as in most of the literature, the stated PDE for H will follow from
the standard filtering theory.
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where FV is of finite variation. Therefore,
[θ, S]ct =
∫ t
0
Hx(s,Xs−)w(s,Xs−) {d[B, θ]s + d[θ, θ]cs} . (3.5)
Moreover, integrating (2.3) by parts (see Corollary 2 of Theorem II.22 in [19]) we get
W θ1 = f(Z1)θ1− −
∫ 1−
0
H(t, Xt−))dθt − [θ,H(·, X)]1− (3.6)
since the jumps of θ are summable. Moreover, direct calculations lead to
Ψat +
1
2
w(t, x)2Ψaxx = −
∫ x
ξ(t,a)
(H(t, u)− a)g(t, u)du. (3.7)
Ito’s formula in conjunction with above yields
Ψa(1−, X1−) = Ψa(0, 0) +
∫ 1−
0
H(t, Xt−)(dBt + dθt)− a(B1 + θ1−)
+
1
2
∫ 1−
0
w(t, Xt−)Hx(t, Xt−)(d[Y, Y ]
c
t − dt)
+
∑
0<t<1
{Ψa(t, Xt)−Ψa(t, Xt−)− (H(t, Xt−)− a)∆θt}
+
∫ 1−
0
(H(t, Xt−)− a) c(t, Xt−)(d[Y, Y ]ct − dt)−
∫ 1−
0
∫ Xt−
ξ(t,a)
(H(t, u)− a)g(t, u)dudt
Combining the above and (3.6) and noting that the stochastic integral with respect to B is
a true martingale we deduce
E0,z
[
W θ1
]
= E0,z
[
Ψf(Z1)(0, 0)−Ψf(Z1)(1−, X1−)− 1
2
∫ 1−
0
w(t, Xt−)Hx(t, Xt−)d[θ, θ]
c
t
+
∫ 1−
0
(H(t, Xt−)− a) c(t, Xt−)(d[Y, Y ]ct − dt)−
∫ 1−
0
∫ Xt−
ξ(t,a)
(H(t, u)− a)g(t, u)dudt
+
∑
0<t<1
{
Ψf(Z1)(t, Xt)−Ψf(Z1)(t, Xt−)− (H(t, Xt)− f(Z1))∆θt
}]
.
Note that since w is positive and H is increasing, we have
Ψa(t, Xt)−Ψa(t, Xt−)− (H(t, Xt)− a)∆θt =
∫ Xt
Xt−
H(t, u)− a
w(t, u)
du− (H(t, Xt)− a)∆θt
≤ (H(t, Xt)− a)
∫ Xt
Xt−
1
w(t, u)
du− (H(t, Xt)− a)∆θt
= (H(t, Xt)− a)j(t, Xt−,∆Yt).
Similarly,
Ψa(t, Xt)−Ψa(t, Xt−)− (H(t, Xt)− a)∆θt ≥ (H(t, Xt−)− a)j(t, Xt−,∆Yt)−∆H(t, Xt)∆θt.

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Remark 3.1. The representation of the expected profit given by the above theorem shows
that the absolutely continuous strategies deliver expected wealth bounded by E0,z[Ψf(Z1)(0, 0)]
when g ≡ 0. Similarly, if the optimisation problem
inf
X
E0,z
[∫ 1−
0
∫ Xt
ξ(t,f(Z1))
(H(t, u)− f(Z1))|g(t, u)|dudt
]
has a finite value, the value function of the insider is also bounded when she is restricted to
use absolutely continuous strategies. In what follows we will impose conditions sufficient for
this to hold.
In view of the above remark we make the following assumption.
Assumption 3.1. For every z ∈ R there exists an x ∈ R such that
E0,z
[∫ 1−
0
∫ x
ξ(t,f(Z1))
(H(t, u)− f(Z1))|g(t, u)|dudt
]
<∞.
Under this assumption we show below that the insider achieves infinite profits unless
the pricing rule penalises the jumps and martingale parts correctly. The assumptions on
the random variable f(Z1) are quite general and are satisfied in the available literature. In
particular they are satisfied in a large class of diffusion models. The condition that c = j = 0,
however, is not satisfied in the available literature unless w is constant.
Theorem 3.2. Assume the Assumption 3.1 holds and (H,w, c, j) is an admissible pricing
rule such that H satisfies (3.2) and w solves (3.1), where g is a continuous function on
[0, 1]× R. Assume further that the random variable f(Z1) is such that :
•
E0,z
[
f 2(Z1)
]
+ E0,z
[
K2w(1, H
−1(1, f(Z1)))
]
<∞, ∀z ∈ R, (3.8)
• limz→−∞E0,z[−f(Z1)] = limz→∞E0,z[f(Z1)] =∞,
• and lim supz→−∞E0,z[f(Z1)1[f(Z1)>k]] <∞, lim infz→∞E0,z[f(Z1)1[f(Z1)<k]] > −∞.
Then there exists a set E such that Q(E) > 0 and for any z ∈ E we have
sup
θ∈A(H,w,c,j)
E0,z[W θ1 ] =∞
unless c and j are identically 0.
Proof. Suppose c(t, x) 6= 0 for some t < 1 and x. Since c is continuous, there exist ν1 < ν2 < 1
and x1 < x2 such that |c(t, x)| > ε for some ε > 0 on [ν1, ν2] × [x1, x2]. Moreover, by the
continuity of K−1w there exists t1 < t2 < 1 and y1 < y2 such that K
−1
w (t, y) ∈ [x1, x2] for all
(t, y) ∈ [t1, t2]× [y1, y2].
We shall construct a continuous trading strategy to achieve arbitrarily large profits for
some realisation of Z1. This construction will be done in three stages. The first stage will
utilise Lemma A.1 to bring X inside [K−1w (t1, y1), [K
−1
w (t1, y2)] at time t1. The second stage
will keep Kw(t, Xt) inside the interval [y1, y2] with arbitrarily large quadratic variation. The
final stage will keep X bounded up to time 1.
Observe that for any continuous semimartingale θ and G(t, x) :=
∫ x
0
g(t, y)dy
dKw(t, Xt) = dYt + c(t, Xt)(d[Y, Y ]t − dt)−G(t, Xt)dt.
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Stage 1: To obtain a bounded Xε satisfying Kw(t1, X
ε
t1
) ∈ (y1, y2) apply Lemma A.1 to
x(t) =
(K−1w (t1, y1) +K
−1
w (t1, y2))t
2t1
and ε =
(K−1w (t1, y2)−K−1w (t1, y1))
4
.
Set X = Xε on [0, t1].
Stage 2: Fix a y ∈ (y1, y2). Consider interval [t1, t2] and the solutions of
dRt = (b+1)dBt+(b+1)
2
(
1
Rt − y11[Rt≤y] −
1
y2 − Rt1[Rt>y]
)
dt+(b2+2b)c(t,K−1w (t, Rt))dt.
and observe that pathwise uniqueness holds until the exit time from (y1, y2) since c is locally
Lipschitz and K−1w is continuously differentiable. Thus, if we can show the existence of a
weak solution that never exits (y1, y2), we will arrive at a strong solution that stays in (y1, y2).
Indeed, since c(t,K−1w (t, x)) is bounded for all (t, x) ∈ (t1, t2)×(y1, y2), by means of Girsanov
transformation, weak solutions of above are the same as those of
dUt = qdβt + q
2
(
1
Ut − y11[Ut≤y] −
1
y2 − Ut1[Ut>y]
)
dt, (3.9)
which are unique in law and never exit (y1, y2) by Proposition 3.1 in [7]. Define Xt :=
K−1w (t, Rt) and observe that
dθt = bdBt + (b+ 1)
2
(
1
Rt − y11[Rt≤y] −
1
y2 − Rt1[Rt>y]
)
dt+G(t,K−1w (t, Rt))dt.
Stage 3: Finally consider the interval (t2, 1]. Apply Lemma A.1 to x(t) = Xt2 and ε as
before to get |Xε| and set X = Xε.
Observe that X constructed above is bounded by a determinstic constant, which in turn
implies the boundedness of H(t, Xt). Thus, θ ∈ A(H,w, c, j). Recall from Theorem 3.1 that
E0,z
[
W θ1
] ≥ E0,z [−Ψf(Z1)(1−, X1−)− b2
2
∫ t2
t1
w(t, Xt−)Hx(t, Xt−)dt
+ (b2 + 2b)
∫ t2
t1
(H(t, Xt−)− f(Z1)) c(t, Xt−)dt−
∫ 1−
0
∫ Xt−
ξ(t,f(Z1))
(H(t, u)− f(Z1))g(t, u)dudt
]
since Ψf(Z1)(0, 0) ≥ 0 and d[θ, θ]t = 0 for t ∈ [0, 1]\[t1, t2]. Moreover, as dKw(1, u) = 1w(1,u) ,
Ψf(Z1)(1−, X1−) ≤ (H(1, X1−)− f(Z1))(Kw(1, X1−)−Kw(1, ξ(1, f(Z1))))
since H and Kw are increasing functions. Since X is bounded and (3.8) holds, we deduce
E0,z[Ψf(Z1)(1−, X1−)] < ℓ1(z) <∞. (3.10)
Also observe that∫ 1−
0
∫ Xt−
ξ(t,f(Z1))
(H(t, u)− f(Z1))|g(t, u)|dudt =
∫ 1−
0
∫ x(z)
ξ(t,f(Z1))
(H(t, u)− f(Z1))|g(t, u)|dudt
+
∫ 1−
0
∫ Xt−
x(z)
(H(t, u)− f(Z1))|g(t, u)|dudt.
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Thus, for some constant ℓ2(z) independent of b due to Assumption 3.1 and X taking values
in a bounded interval,
E0,z
[∫ 1−
0
∫ Xt−
ξ(t,f(Z1))
(H(t, u)− f(Z1))|g(t, u)|dudt
]
≤ ℓ2(z) <∞. (3.11)
Therefore,
E0,z
[
W θ1
] ≥ ℓ(z) + E0,z [∫ t2
t1
(
(b2 + 2b) (H(t, Xt−)− f(Z1)) c(t, Xt)− b
2
2
w(t, Xt−)Hx(t, Xt−)
)
dt
]
≥ ℓ(z) + b2(m1 +mE0,z[f(Z1)] + (M −m)E0,z[f(Z1)1[f(Z1)<0]])
+b(m3 + 2mE
0,z[f(Z1)] + 2(M −m)E0,z[f(Z1)1[f(Z1)<0]])
= ℓ(z) + b2(m1 +ME
0,z [f(Z1)] + (m−M)E0,z[f(Z1)1[f(Z1)≥0]])
+b(m3 + 2ME
0,z[f(Z1)] + 2(m−M)E0,z[f(Z1)1[f(Z1)≥0]]),
where the constants m and M such that mM > 0 and M ≥ − ∫ t2
t1
c(t, Xt)dt ≥ m exist due
to the continuity of c, boundedness of X and that c(t, Xt) is bounded away from 0 on [t1, t2]
by construction.
Observe that the coefficient of b2 in above can be made positive for large enough z (resp.
small enough z) if m > 0 (resp. if M < 0) due to our assumption on the random variable
f(Z1). This implies that insider’s wealth can be made arbitrarily large for such z by making
b arbitrarily large. This yields the claim that c must be 0 for insider’s profit to be finite.
Next, suppose c ≡ 0, but j(t, x, κ) 6= 0 for some t < 1 and x, κ. Without loss of generality,
assume j(t, x, κ) > 0 (the proof in the case j(t, x, κ) < 0 is similar). Since j is continuous,
there exist t1 < t2 < 1, x1 < x2, and κ1 < κ2 such that j(t, x, κ) > δ for some δ > 0 on
[t1, t2]× [x1, x2]× [κ1, κ2].
We will construct a strategy that achieves an arbitrarily large profit for some realisations
of Z1. This will be again done in three stages: first, we will bring X inside the interval
[x1, x2] at time t1 via Lemma A.1. On the interval [t1, t2] we will construct a process with an
arbitrary number of jumps each of which will give positive contribution to the final utility.
Finally, we will keep X in the interval [x1, x2] after time t2.
Fix 0 < ε < x2−x1
2
Stage 1: On the interval [0, t1) let x(t) =
x1+x2
2t1
t and apply Lemma A.1 with ε as above to
obtain a bounded process X such that Xt1− ∈ (x1, x2). The associated θε will be
used as insider’s strategy on [0, t1).
Stage 2: Next, we iteratively construct the process of jumps on [t1, t2].
To this end, consider si = t1 + i
t2−t1
n
, for i = 0, n and set θt1 = θs0 = θs0− + κ1.
Observe that j(s0, Xs0−, κ1) > δ, and Xs0 = K
−1
w (s0, j(s0, Xs0−, κ1)+Kw(s0, Xs0−)+
κ1).
Suppose we already constructed the process θ (and X) on [0, si] and i < n, then
on the interval (si, si+1) consider x(t) = Xsi +
x1+x2
2
−Xsi
si+1−si
(t − si) and apply Lemma
A.1 with ε as above. Similar to Stage 1 the associated θε will be used as the trading
strategy and X satisfies Xsi+1− ∈ [x1, x2]. Finally, for i < n−1, set θsi+1 = θsi+1−+κ1.
12 ON PRICING RULES AND OPTIMAL STRATEGIES IN GENERAL KYLE-BACK MODELS
We again obtain j(si+1, Xsi+1−, κ1) > δ, and Xsi+1 = K
−1
w (si+1, j(si+1, Xsi+1−, κ1) +
Kw(si+1, Xsi+1−) + κ1).
If i = n− 1, define θsi+1 = θsi+1− and Xsi+1 = Xsi+1−.
Thus, we constructed a process θ with n jumps such that [θ, θ]c ≡ 0.
Stage 3: On the interval [t2, 1] use Lemma A.1 to construct X to stay in the interval [x1, x2]
by using x(t) = x1+x2
2
with the same ε.
Thus, we constructed a process θ and X with n jumps such that [θ, θ]c ≡ 0 and X is
taking values in (m,M) for some m < M . Since X is bounded, H(t, Xt) is also bounded
and therefore θ ∈ A(H,w, c, j). Moreover, due to Theorem 3.1, (3.4) and the fact that
Ψf(Z1)(0, 0) ≥ 0 we have
E0,z
[
W θ1
] ≥ E0,z [−Ψf(Z1)(1−, X1−)−
∫ 1−
0
∫ Xt−
ξ(t,f(Z1))
(H(t, u)− f(Z1))g(t, u)dudt
+
∑
0<t<1
{(H(t, Xt−)− f(Z1))j(t, Xt−,∆Yt)−∆H(t, Xt)∆θt}
]
.
Using the computations that led to (3.10)and (3.11) we obtain
E0,z
[
Ψf(Z1)(1−, X1−) +
∫ 1−
0
∫ Xt−
ξ(t,f(Z1))
(H(t, u)− f(Z1))|g(t, u)|dudt
]
≤ ℓ1(z) <∞, ∀z.
Note that the constant ℓ1 is independent of n.
Furthermore, since the jumps of θ are of size κ1, the jumps of X are uniformly bounded
and jumps occur only at si, we have ∆H(t, Xt)∆θt ≤ ℓ2 <∞.
Combining the above estimates with the expression for wealth, we get
E0,z
[
W θ1
] ≥ E0,z
[
n−1∑
i=0
(H(si, Xsi−)− f(Z1))j(t, Xsi−, κ1)
]
− ℓ1(z)− ℓ2.
Let jm = min(t,x)∈[t1,t2]×[x1,x2] j(t, x, κ1) > δ, ∞ > jM = max(t,x)∈[t1,t2]×[x1,x2] j(t, x, κ1), hm =
min(t,x)∈[t1,t2]×[x1,x2]H(t, x) > −∞, hM = max(t,x)∈[t1,t2]×[x1,x2]H(t, x) <∞. We have
E0,z [(H(si, Xsi−)− f(Z1))j(t, Xsi−, κ1)] ≥ E0,z [(hm − f(Z1))j(t, Xsi−, κ1)]
= E0,z
[
(hm − f(Z1))j(t, Xsi−, κ1)1[hm<f(Z1)]
]
+E0,z
[
(hm − f(Z1))j(t, Xsi−, κ1)1[hm≥f(Z1)]
]
≥ (jM − jm)
(
min{0, hm} − E0,z
[
f(Z1)1[hm<f(Z1)]
])
+jm
(
hm −E0,z [f(Z1)]
)
.
Since limz→−∞E
0,z[f(Z1)] = −∞ and lim supz→−∞E0,z[f(Z1)1[f(Z1)>k]] <∞, there exists a
constant z1 such that for any z < z1 we will have
E0,z [(H(si, Xsi−)− f(Z1))j(t, Xsi−, κ1)] > 1
for all i. Thus we will have E0,z
[
W θ1
] ≥ n− ℓ1(z)− ℓ2, and letting n→∞ will complete the
proof. 
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The following theorem allows a glimpse into the optimal strategy of the insider. It shows
that if the pricing rule satisfies c = j = 0, it is not optimal for the insider to use jumps.
Theorem 3.3. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium ((H∗, w∗), θ∗), where (H∗, w∗) satisfy
(3.2) and (3.1). Assume Z0 = Z1, limz→∞ f(z) = − limz→−∞ f(z) = ∞, and gHy as a
function on [0, 1]× R¯ with values in R¯ is continuous. Then P 0,z(ω : θ∗t (ω) ∈ C([0, 1))) = 1.
The proof of this theorem is postponed to the Appendix. It relies on the following lemma
that will also be useful in the proof of Theorem 3.4. This lemma shows that only a class of
weighting functions that satisfy a further condition on g can be supported in an equilibrium.
Thus it allows us to restrict the set of admissible pricing rules further.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose Z0 = Z1, limz→∞ f(z) = − limz→−∞ f(z) = ∞, and there exists an
equilibrium ((H,w), θ), where H solves (3.2) and w satisfies (3.1). Assume further that g
Hy
as a function on [0, 1] × R¯ with values in R¯ is continuous. Then g
Hy
is bounded from below
on [0, 1]× R.
Proof. Let us first show that the existence of equilibrium impliesH(t,∞) = −H(t,−∞) =∞
for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Indeed, if there exists tˆ such that H(tˆ, x) ≥ h for all x ∈ R, then for all s ≤ tˆ
we have H(s, x) ≥ h for all x ∈ R. This follows from the fact that Y is a Brownian motion
in the market maker’s filtration in equilibrium and, thus, the random variable Xt has full
support due to Remark 2.1. That Y is a Brownian motion is a consequence of rationality,
Hx > 0 and H satisfies (3.2).
However, uniform boundedness of the price from below on [0, tˆ] gives an unbounded profit
for the insider contradicting the definition of equilibrium. Indeed, since f is unbounded from
below there exists a z ∈ R such that f(z) < h. Consider the trading strategy
dθt = −n1[0,tˆ](t)dt
and note that integrating by parts the associated final wealth we obtain
W1 = −n
∫ tˆ
0
(f(z)−H(t, Xt)) dt ≥ n(h− f(z))tˆ→∞ as n→∞.
Therefore, we can assume that H(t,∞) = −H(t,−∞) =∞ for all t ∈ [0, 1].
Next denote g
Hy
(t, H−1(t, x)) by g˜(t, x) and observe that∫ ∞
ξ(t,a)
(H(t, u)− a)g(t, u)du =
∫ ∞
a
(u− a)g˜(t, u)du.
Suppose that for all t ∈ [0, 1] we have limu→∞ gHy (t, H−1(t, u)) = limu→∞ g˜(t, u) ≥ 0 as
well as limu→−∞ g˜(t, u) ≥ 0, and consider An := {(t, u) ∈ [0, 1]× R : g˜(t, u) ≤ −n}. Clearly,
An is closed for each n ≥ 1. Moreover, it is also bounded. Indeed, suppose there exists a
sequence (tm, um)m≥1 ⊂ An such that limm→∞ tm = t ≤ 1 and limm→∞ um = ∞ or −∞.
Then, limm→∞ g˜(tm, um) ≥ 0 due to the joint continuity of g˜, which is a contradiction. Thus
Ans are compact and their intersection would be nonempty by the nested set property if g˜
were not bounded from below. However, if (tˆ, uˆ) ∈ [0, 1] × R belongs to the intersection,
g˜(tˆ, uˆ) = −∞. Thus, the intersection must be empty and, therefore, g˜ is bounded from
below.
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Next suppose that there exists a tˆ such that either limu→∞ g˜(tˆ, u) < 0 or limu→−∞ g˜(tˆ, u) <
0. Without loss of generality assume the former and observe that this leads to g˜(t, x) < −c
for all (t, x) in [t1, t2]× [x1,∞) for some c > 0 and t1, t2 in [0, 1] and x1 ∈ R due to the joint
continuity of g˜. Note that x1 can be assumed to satisfy H(t, x1) ≥ f(z) for all t ∈ [t1, t2] due
to the continuity and monotonicity of H .
Let xn : [0, 1] → R be the piecewise linear function defined by xn(0) = 0, xn(t1) =
x1 +
1
2
, xn(3t1+t2
4
) = x1 + n +
1
2
, xn(t2) = x1 +
1
2
, xn(1) = f(z) and xn(t) = x1 + n +
1
2
for all t ∈ [3t1+t2
4
, t1+3t2
4
]. Consider ε = 1
4
and an application of Lemma A.1 yields an
existence of an admissible strategy θn that is continuous and of finite variation and satisfies
supt∈[0,1] |Xnt − xn(t)| < 14 , where Xn is as in the Lemma. The wealth associated with this
strategy is given by
W n1 := Ψ
f(z)(0, 0)− E0,z
[∫ 1
0
∫ H(t,Xnt )
f(z)
(u− f(z))g˜(t, u)dudt
]
by Theorem 3.1. Since Xn is uniformly bounded on [0, t1] and[t2, 1], we only need to consider
the above integral on [t1, t2]. Moreover, continuity of g˜ implies
W n1 ≥ ℓ− E0,z
[∫ t2
t1
∫ H(t,Xnt )
x1
(u− f(z))g˜(t, u)dudt
]
≥ ℓ−E0,z
[∫ 3t2+t1
4
3t1+t2
4
∫ H(t,Xnt )
x1
(u− f(z))g˜(t, u)dudt
]
≥ ℓ+ c
2
E0,z
[∫ 3t2+t1
4
3t1+t2
4
(H(t, Xnt )− f(z))2dt
]
,
where the second and third inequality are due to g˜ being less than or equal to −c on [t1, t2]×
[x1,∞). Since H(t, Xnt ) ≥ f(z) on [3t1+t24 , t1+3t24 ], it follows from the monotone convergence
theorem that W n1 →∞ as n→∞, which contradicts the definition of equilibrium. 
Remark 3.2. Note that in view of the above lemma we can take H to be the identity func-
tion. Indeed, if (H,w) is a pricing rule satisfying the conditions of above lemma, then
(H˜, w˜), where H˜(t, x) = x and w˜(t, x) = Hx(t, H
−1(t, x))w(t, H−1(t, x)) is also a pricing
rule satisfying the conditions of the lemma with g˜(t, x) = g(t,H
−1(t,x))
Hx(t,H−1(t,x))
. Moreover,
∫ x
ξ(t,a)
(H(t, u)− a)g(t, u)du =
∫ H(t,x)
a
(u− a)g˜(t, u)du,
and H(t,∞) = −H(t,−∞) =∞ for all t ∈ [0, 1].
Moreover, consider St := H(t, Xt), where X is the unique solution of (2.7) with c = j = 0.
Then
dSt = w˜(t, St−)dY
c
t +
w˜(t, St−)w˜x(t, St−)
2
(d[Y, Y ]ct − dt) + (H(t, Xt)−H(t, Xt−),
and, therefore, S satisfies (2.7) with w = w˜. Indeed,
St− +H(t, Xt)−H(t, Xt−) = K−1w˜ (t,Kw˜(t, St−) + ∆Yt).
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The above is equivalent to
∆Yt = Kw˜(t, H(t, Xt))−Kw˜(t, St−) =
∫ St
St−
1
w˜(t, y)
dy =
∫ Xt
Xt−
1
w(t, y)
dy,
which holds in view of dynamics of X. Therefore, without loss of generality we can assume
H is identity.
The following theorem provides the justification that the weighting function must satisfy
the PDE (3.1) with g = 0.
Theorem 3.4. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium ((H∗, w∗), θ∗), where (H∗, w∗) sat-
isfies (3.2) and (3.1). Assume Z0 = Z1, limz→∞ f(z) = − limz→−∞ f(z) = ∞, and gHy as a
function on [0, 1]× R¯ with values in R¯ is continuous.
Assume further that there exists a set E such that Q(E) = 1 and for all z ∈ E there exists
a continuous function sf(z) of finite variation such that
sf(z)(t) := argmax
x
−
∫ x
ξ(t,f(z))
(H∗(t, y)−f(z))g(t, y)dy = argmin
x
∫ x
ξ(t,f(z))
(H∗(t, y)−f(z))g(t, y)dy
(3.12)
for all t ∈ [0, ν]. Then g ≡ 0 for all t ∈ [0, ν).
Proof. Note that θ∗ is continuous in view of Theorem 3.3. Observe that H∗ can be taken
equal to identity in view of Remark 3.2. We will also restrict our attention to z ∈ E.
Fix z ∈ E. We show that X∗ must be such that X∗t = argminx
∫ x
f(z)
(y− f(z))g(t, y)dy for
all t ∈ (0, ν). Suppose not, i.e. assume that there exists t ∈ (0, ν) and δ > 0 such that
P 0,z
[∫ X∗t
f(z)
(y − f(z))g(t, y)dy −
∫ sf(z)(t)
f(z)
(y − f(z))g(t, y)dy > δ
]
> 0.
since both X∗ and sf(z) are continuous on [0, ν] and
∫ X∗u
f(z)
(y − f(z))g(u, y)dy − ∫ sf(z)(u)
f(z)
(y −
f(z))g(u, y)dy ≥ 0 for all u ∈ [0, ν] we will have
P 0,z
[∫ ν
0
∫ X∗t
f(z)
(y − f(z))g(t, y)dydt−
∫ ν
0
∫ sf(z)(t)
f(z)
(y − f(z))g(t, y)dydt > 0
]
> 0.
This implies
E0,z
[∫ ν
0
∫ X∗t
sf(z)(t)
(y − f(z))g(t, y)dydt
]
= δ > 0 (3.13)
For any ε > 0 consider sε such that sε(0) = 0, sε = sf(z) on [ε, ν), and sε is continuous
and monotone on [0, ε]. Due to Lemma A.1 there exists Xε such that
sup
t∈[0,ν]
|sε(t)−Xεt | < ε.
We will use the corresponding θε as the insider’s strategy on [0, ν].
On [ν, ν + ε] set dθε = −dBt + f(z)−Xενεw(t,Xεt )dt and note that X
ε remains bounded on [ν, ν + ε]
and Xεν+ε = f(z).
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Now consider the interval [ν + ε, ν + 2ε] and introduce
dRεt = dBt +
R∗t − Rεt
ν + 2ε− tdt,
with Rεν+ε = Kw(ν + ε, f(z)). It is easy to see that the solution to the above SDE on
[ν + ε, ν + 2ε) is given by
Rεt = (ν + 2ε− t)
[
Rεν+ε +
∫ t
ν+ε
1
ν + 2ε− sdBs +
∫ t
ν+ε
R∗s
(ν + 2ε− s)2ds
]
,
where R∗t = Kw(t, X
∗
t ). Observe that the first two terms in the square brackets multiplies
by (ν + 2ε− t) converge two 0 as t→ ν + 2ε in view of Exercise IX.2.12 in [20]. Moreover,
on [R∗ν+2ε 6= 0] an application of L’Hospital’s rule shows that the third term multiplied by
(ν + 2ε− t) converges to R∗ν+2ε. Similarly, on [R∗ν+2ε = 0], (ν + 2ε− t)
∫ t
ν+ε
|R∗s |
(ν+2ε−s)2
ds→ 0.
Therefore, Rεν+2ε = R
∗
ν+2ε, a.s.. Note that if we define τR := inf{t ≥ ν + ε : R∗t = Rεt}, then
Rε is a semimartingale on [ν + ε, τR]. Indeed,∫ τR
ν+ε
|R∗t −Rεt |
(ν + 2ε− t)dt =
∣∣∣∣
∫ τR
ν+ε
R∗t − Rεt
(ν + 2ε− t)dt
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣BτR − RετR − Bν+ε +Rεν+ε∣∣ <∞.
Next we define X˜t = K
−1
w (t, R
ε
t ) for t ∈ [ν + ε, ν + 2ε] and set
Xεt =
{
f(z) + (X˜t − f(z))+, if X∗ν+ε ≥ f(z);
f(z)− (X˜t − f(z))−, if X∗ν+ε < f(z),
∀t ∈ [ν + ε, τ ],
where τ = inf{t ≥ ν+ε : X∗t = f(z)}∧τR. First note that τ ≤ ν+2ε and for all t ∈ [ν+ε, τ ]
we have either X∗t ≥ Xεt ≥ f(z) or f(z) ≥ Xεt ≥ X∗t depending on X∗ν+ε. Moreover, Xετ = X∗τ
so we can set Xεt = X
∗
t for t ∈ [τ, 1].
Xε on [ν + ε, τ ] satisfies
dXεt = w(t, X
ε
t )(dBt + dθ
ε
t ),
where in case X∗ν+ε ≥ f(z)
dθεt = 1[Xεt>f(z)]
(
G(t, Xεt ) +
R∗t − Rεt
ν + 2ε− t
)
dt+
1
2
dL˜t − 1[Xεt=f(z)]dBt,
and L˜ is the local time of X˜ at f(z) in view of Theorem 68 in Chap. IV of [19]. Similarly,
if X∗ν+ε < f(z),
dθεt = 1[Xεt<f(z)]
(
G(t, Xεt ) +
R∗t −Rεt
ν + 2ε− t
)
dt− 1
2
dL˜t − 1[Xεt=f(z)]dBt.
Clearly, θε is admissible since Xε is bounded on [0, ν + ε] and |Xεt − f(z)| ≤ |X∗t − f(z)|
for all t ∈ [ν + ε, 1] and X∗ is admissible.
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We shall show that the above strategy will outperform θ∗ for small enough ε.
E0,z[W ε1 −W ∗1 ] ≥ E0,z
[
−
∫ ε
0
∫ Xεt
sf(z)(t)
(u− f(z))g(t, u)dudt−
∫ ν
ε
∫ Xεt
sf(z)(t)
(u− f(z))g(t, u)dudt
+
∫ ν+ε
ν
∫ X∗t
f(z)
(u− f(z))(g(t, u) + C)dudt−
∫ ν+ε
ν
∫ Xεt
f(z)
(u− f(z))g(t, u)dudt
−C
∫ ν+ε
ν
∫ X∗t
f(z)
(u− f(z))dudt+
∫ ν+2ε
ν+ε
∫ X∗t
Xεt
(u− f(z))(g(t, u) + C)dudt
− C
∫ ν+2ε
ν+ε
∫ X∗t
Xεt
(u− f(z))dudt− εℓ
]
+ δ
≥ −εℓ1 − C
2
E0,z
[∫ ν+2ε
ν
(X∗t − f(z))2dt−
∫ ν+2ε
ν+ε
(Xεt − f(z))2dt
]
+ δ,
where the first inequality is due to (3.13) and the boundedness of Xε on [ν, ν + ε] in con-
junction with the following estimate:
−
∫ 1
ν
w(t, Xεt )d[θ
ε, θε]t +
∫ 1
0
w(t, X∗t )d[θ
∗, θ∗]t = −
∫ τ
ν
w(t, Xεt )d[θ
ε, θε]t +
∫ τ
0
w(t, X∗t )d[θ
∗, θ∗]t
≥ −
∫ ν+ε
ν
w(t, Xεt )dt+
∫ τ
ν+ε
1[Xεt=f(z)]w(t, f(z))dt ≥ εℓ.
The second inequality is due to the fact that the first, second and the fourth terms are
integrals of continuous functions on compact domains whose measures are proportional to ε,
and the sixth is positive since by construction either X∗ ≥ Xε ≥ f(z) or X∗ ≤ Xε ≤ f(z)
on [ν + ε, ν + 2ε] and g is bounded from below by some constant −C in view of Lemma 3.1.
Finally, the above lower estimate converges to δ as ε→ 0 due to the square integrability of
Xε and Xε.
Thus, θ∗ should be such that X∗t = argminx
∫ x
f(z)
(y − f(z))g(t, y)dy for all t ∈ (0, ν) for
t ∈ [0, ν].
Define
Et(s) := {a ∈ R : s = argmin
x
∫ x
a
(y − a)g(t, y)dy},
a set of realisations of insider’s signal that allow the insider to set X∗t = s.
In what follows we will show that : i) Et(s) is a connected set for all t ∈ [0, ν], and ii) for
all Et(s) such that s ∈ Et(s) and {s} 6= Et(s) we have g(t, y) = 0 for all y ∈ Et(s).
This will imply that g ≡ 0 for all t ∈ [0, ν). Indeed, suppose there exists (t, a) ∈ [0, ν)×R
such that g(t, a) 6= 0. Since g is continuous, there exists a set [a1, a2] ⊆ R such that
g(t, a) 6= 0 for all a ∈ [a1, a2]. Due to ii) we must have X∗t = a on the set {f(Z1) = a}
for all a ∈ [a1, a2]. Indeed, suppose on the set {f(Z1) = a} we have X∗t = s 6= a. Since
s = X∗t = argminx
∫ x
f(z)
(y−f(z))g(t, y)dy, ii) yields that s /∈ Et(s) (since a ∈ Et(s)), but then
we have a contradiction to the rationality of the pricing rule as s = X∗t = E[f(Z1)|FMt ] =
E[f(Z1)1[f(Z1)∈Et(s)]|FMt ] ∈ Et(s), where the last inclusion is due to i). Thus, we have
X∗t = a on the set {f(Z1) = a} for all a ∈ [a1, a2], or, equivalently, X∗t = f(Z1) for all
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Z1 ∈ f−1([a1, a2]), but this means that the rational pricing rule must satisfy X∗s = X∗t for
any s ≥ t which is not consistent with the definition of the pricing rule since w > 0.
i) Et(s) is connected: Suppose a1, a2 ∈ Et(s) and λ ∈ [0, 1]. We need to show that
a = λa1 + (1− λ)a2 ∈ Et(s). Indeed, for any r ∈ R we have:∫ r
a
(y − a)g(t, y)dy −
∫ s
a
(y − a)g(t, y)dy =
∫ r
s
(y − a)g(t, y)dy
= λ
(∫ r
a1
(y − a1)g(t, y)dy −
∫ s
a1
(y − a1)g(t, y)dy
)
+(1− λ)
(∫ r
a2
(y − a2)g(t, y)dy −
∫ s
a2
(y − a2)g(t, y)dy
)
≥ 0,
where the last inequality is due to the fact that for i = 1, 2∫ s
ai
(y − ai)g(t, y)dy = min
r∈R
∫ r
ai
(y − ai)g(t, y)dy.
This implies that
∫ r
a
(y − a)g(t, y)dy ≥ ∫ s
a
(y − a)g(t, y)dy for all r ∈ R and therefore
a ∈ Et(s).
ii) s ∈ Et(s) and {s} 6= Et(s) ⇒ g(t,y) = 0 for all y ∈ Et(s). Suppose there exist
(t, s) ∈ [0, ν] × R such that: s ∈ Et(s), Et(s) 6= {s}, and g(t, y˜) 6= 0 for some
y˜ ∈ Et(s).
Since s ∈ Et(s) for any r ∈ R we will have∫ r
s
(y − s)g(t, y)dy ≥
∫ s
s
(y − s)g(t, y)dy = 0.
Let G(t, y) =
∫ y
s
g(t, u)du. We have
0 ≤
∫ r
s
(y − s)g(t, y)dy =
∫ r
s
(y − s)dG(t, y) = (r − s)G(t, r)−
∫ r
s
G(t, y)dy
= (r − s)(G(t, r)−G(t, ψ)) (3.14)
for any r ∈ R and some ψ ∈ [r ∧ s, r ∨ s].
Note that y˜ 6= s since for any a ∈ Et(s) we have s = argminx
∫ x
a
(y − a)g(t, y)dy
and therefore the first order conditions imply g(t, s) = 0 as we can choose a 6= s.
Suppose y˜ > s. Let G(t, y∗) = miny∈[s,y˜]G(t, y). Due to (3.14) there exists ψ ∈
[s, y∗] such that
(y∗ − s)G(t, y∗)−
∫ y∗
s
G(t, y)dy = (y∗ − s)(G(t, y∗)−G(t, ψ)) ≥ 0 (3.15)
and therefore G(t, y∗) ≥ G(t, ψ). Thus, G(t, y∗) = G(t, ψ) and (3.15) implies∫ y∗
s
G(t, y)dy = (y∗ − s)G(t, ψ) = (y∗ − s)G(t, y∗) =
∫ y∗
s
min
y∈[s,y∗]
G(t, y)dy.
This yields G(t, y) = const for y ∈ [s, y∗] and in particular G(t, s) = G(t, y∗) =
miny∈[s,y˜]G(t, y). Since G(t, y) = const for y ∈ [s, y∗] and g is continuous, we have
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g(t, y) = 0 for y ∈ [s, y∗]. Thus y˜ 6= y∗ which implies G(t, s) = miny∈[s,y˜]G(t, y) <
G(t, y˜).
Since y˜ ∈ Et(s) we have
(s− y˜)(G(t, s)−G(t, φ)) = (s− y˜)dG(t, s)−
∫ s
y˜
G(t, y)dy =
∫ s
y˜
(y − y˜)dG(t, y)
=
∫ s
y˜
(y − y˜)g(t, y)dy ≤
∫ y˜
y˜
(y − y˜)g(t, y)dy = 0
for some φ ∈ [s, y˜]. Thus G(t, φ) = G(t, s) = miny∈[0,y˜]G(t, y) and therefore∫ y˜
s
min
y∈[0,y˜]
G(t, y)dy = (y˜ − s)G(t, φ) =
∫ y˜
s
G(t, y)dy.
Since G is continuous it implies that G(t, y) = G(t, s) for all y ∈ [0, y˜] which contra-
dicts the above result that G(t, s) < G(t, y˜). Thus, we can not have y˜ ≥ s.
Suppose y˜ < s. Let G(t, y∗) = maxy∈[y˜,s]G(t, y). Due to (3.14) there exists ψ ∈
[y∗, s] such that
(y∗ − s)G(t, y∗)−
∫ y∗
s
G(t, y)dy = (y∗ − s)(G(t, y∗)−G(t, ψ)) ≥ 0 (3.16)
and therefore G(t, y∗) ≤ G(t, ψ). Thus, G(t, y∗) = G(t, ψ) and (3.16) implies∫ y∗
s
G(t, y)dy = (y∗ − s)G(t, ψ) = (y∗ − s)G(t, y∗) =
∫ y∗
s
max
y∈[y∗,s]
G(t, y)dy.
This yields G(t, y) = const for y ∈ [y∗, s] and in particular G(t, s) = G(t, y∗) =
maxy∈[y˜,s]G(t, y). Since G(t, y) = const for y ∈ [y∗, s] and g is continuous, we have
g(t, y) = 0 for y ∈ [y∗, s]. Thus y˜ 6= y∗ which implies G(t, s) = maxy∈[y˜,s]G(t, y) >
G(t, y˜).
Since y˜ ∈ Et(s) we have
(s− y˜)(G(t, s)−G(t, φ)) = (s− y˜)dG(t, s)−
∫ s
y˜
G(t, y)dy =
∫ s
y˜
(y − y˜)dG(t, y)
=
∫ s
y˜
(y − y˜)g(t, y)dy ≤
∫ y˜
y˜
(y − y˜)g(t, y)dy = 0
for some φ ∈ [s, y˜]. Thus G(t, φ) = G(t, s) = maxy∈[y˜,s]G(t, y) and therefore∫ y˜
s
min
y∈[0,y˜]
G(t, y)dy = (y˜ − s)G(t, φ) =
∫ y˜
s
G(t, y)dy.
Since G is continuous it implies that G(t, y) = G(t, s) for all y ∈ [0, y˜] which con-
tradicts the above result that G(t, s) < G(t, y˜). Thus, there doesn’t exist y˜ ∈ Et(s)
such that g(t, y˜) 6= 0.

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4. Absolute continuity of the optimal strategy of the insider
In this section we will show that the equations (3.1)-(3.2) with g = 0 imply the insider
must use continuous strategies of finite variation under a mild further condition on the pricing
rule. To understand this assumption in (4.5) supposeKw(1, H
−1(1, f(Z1))) is P
0,z-integrable,
define
Mt := E
0,z
[
Kw(1, H
−1(1, f(Z1)))|FZt
]
(4.1)
and observe that M is independent of B. We will further assume that
d[M,M ]t = σ˜
2
t dt (4.2)
for some measurable process σ˜.
This process M will be used by the insider to drive the market price to its fundamental
value. Under the optimality conditions of the theorem below Kw(1, H
−1(1, f(Z1))) = Y1.
Thus, M corresponds to the insider’s expectation of the final total demand using her own
private information only. Not using public information ensures M is independent of B.
The condition (4.5) is in fact an assumption on the quadratic variation of the signal and is
satisfied in the Markovian framework employed in the earlier Kyle-Back models (see, among
others, [14], [3], [5],[22], and [6]).
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that
E0,z
(
f 2(Z1)
)
<∞, ∀z ∈ R, (4.3)
i.e. f(Z1) is square integrable for any initial condition of Z. Let (H,w) be an admissible
pricing rule satisfying (3.1) and (3.2) with g = 0. Then θ ∈ A(H,w) is an optimal strategy
if
i) θ is continuous and of finite variation,
ii) and H(1−, X1−) = f(Z1), P 0,z-a.s.,
where
Xt =
∫ t
0
w(s,Xs){dBs + dθs}.
Moreover, if we further assume that
E0,z
[
K2w(1, H
−1(1, f(Z1)))
]
<∞, ∀z ∈ R, (4.4)
and M defined by (4.1) satisfies (4.2) with σ˜ such that
lim sup
t→1
σ˜2t (1− t)α−1 = 0 (4.5)
for some α ∈ (1, 2), then for any θ ∈ A(H,w), there exists a sequence of admissible absolutely
continuous strategies, (θn)n≥1, such that
E0,z
[
W θ1
] ≤ lim
n→∞
E0,z
[
W θ
n
1
]
.
Proof. In view of (3.4) and since w is positive and H is increasing, we have
E0,z
[
W θ1
] ≤ E0,z [Ψf(Z1)(0, 0)−Ψf(Z1)(1−, X1−)]
Note the inequality above becomes equality if and only if ∆θt = 0 due to the strict monotonic-
ity ofH . Moreover, Ψf(Z1)(1−, X1−) ≥ 0 with an equality if and only ifH(1−, X1−) = f(Z1).
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Therefore, E0,z
[
W θ1
] ≤ E0,z [Ψf(Z1)(0, 0)] for all admissible θs and equality is reached if and
only if the following two conditions are met:
i) θ is continuous and of finite variation.
ii) H(1−, X1−) = f(Z1), P 0,z-a.s..
Hence, the proof will be complete if one can find a sequence of absolutely continuous
admissible strategies, (θn)n≥1 such that limn→∞E
0,z
[
W θ
n
1
]
= E0,z
[
Ψf(Z1)(0, 0)
]
.
Consider the bridge process, Y , that starts at 0 and ends up at M1 at t = 1:
Yt := Bt +
∫ t
0
Ms − Ys
1− s ds = (1− t)
(∫ t
0
1
1− sdBs +
∫ t
0
Ms
(1− s)2ds
)
.
It is easy to check that the above converges a.s. to M1 using the continuity of M and
L’Hospital rule since (1 − t) ∫ t
0
1
1−s
dBs is the Brownian bridge from 0 to 0 as in Exercise
IX.2.12 in [20].
To establish the semimartingale property of Y first observe that
Yt −Mt = (1− t)
∫ t
0
1
1− s{dBs − dMs}.
Thus, by Theorem V.1.6 in [20], there exists a Brownian motion β˜ such that∫ 1
0
|Mt − Yt|
1− t dt =
∫ 1
0
|β˜τt |dt,
where
τt =
∫ t
0
1 + σ˜2s
(1− s)2ds.
Observe that τ1 =∞, P 0,z-a.s.. Thus by the law of iterated logarithm for Brownian motion
(see Corollary II.1.12 in [20]), we have
|β˜τt |√
τt log log τt
< C ∀t ∈ [0, 1], P 0,z-a.s.
for some finite random variable C. Therefore,∫ 1
0
|Mt − Yt|
1− t dt < C
∫ 1
0
√
τt log log τtdt ≤ C
∫ 1
0
τ
1+ε
2
t dt, (4.6)
for all ε > 0. Thus, Y is a semimartingale.
Note that (4.5) implies that for any n > 1 there exists δ > 0 such that for any s ∈ [1−δ, 1],
σ˜2s(1− s)α−1 < 1n . Therefore, for t ≥ 1− δ,
(1−t)α
∫ t
0
1 + σ˜2s
(1− s)2ds ≤ (1−t)
α−1−(1−t)α+(1−t)α
(∫ 1−δ
0
1 + σ˜2s
(1− s)2ds+
1
n
(
(1− t)−α − δ−α)) ,
which in turn yields limt→1 τt(1− t)α = 0. Hence,∫ 1
0
τ
1+ε
2
t dt ≤ C˜
∫ 1
0
(1− t)−α(1+ε)2 dt <∞
for any ε < 2
α
− 1. This proves the semimartingale property of Y in view of (4.6).
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Next define the stopping times
τn := inf{t : |Yt| ≥ n}
with the convention that inf ∅ = 1, and introduce the sequence of trading strategies, θn given
by
dθnt = 1[τn≥t]
Mt − Yt
1− t dt+ 1[τn,m<t]dθ˜
n
t ,
where θ˜n is the continuous and of finite variation process given by Lemma A.1 to keep
Y nt ∈ (−1 − n, 1 + n) for t ≥ τn via choosing x(t) = Yτn 1−t1−τn and ε = w = 1. This will also
ensure that Y n1 ∈ (−1, 1) on [τn < 1]. Thus, the total demand process Y n corresponding to
θn satisfies
(1) supt∈[0,1] |Y nt | ≤ n+ 1, a.s.;
(2) Y n1 1[τn=1] = Y11[τn=1] = Kw(1, H
−1(1, f(Z1)))1[τn=1], a.s..
(3) Y n1 1[τn<1] ∈ (−1, 1).
In view of Remark 2.1 and the continuity of H(1, K−1w (1, ·)) we deduce that H(t,K−1w (t, Y nt ))
is bounded uniformly in t yielding θn admissible for each n.
Recall that since θn is absolutely continuous, we have
E0,z[W θ
n
] = E0,z
[
Ψf(Z1)(0, 0)−Ψf(Z1)(1, K−1w (1, Y n1 ))
]
.
On the other hand,
Ψf(Z1)(1, K−1w (1, Y
n
1 )) ≤ (H(1, K−1w (1, Y n1 ))− f(Z1))(Y n1 −Kw(1, H−1(1, f(Z1))))
= 1[τn<1](H(1, K
−1
w (1, Y
n
1 ))− f(Z1))(Y n1 −Kw(1, H−1(1, f(Z1)))).
Since f(Z1)Kw(1, H
−1(1, f(Z1))) is integrable and Y
n
1 is uniformly bounded, applying the
dominated convergence theorem yields
lim
n→∞
E0,z[W θ
n
] = E0,z
[
Ψf(Z1)(0, 0)
]
,
i.e. the expected wealth corresponding to our sequence of admissible strategies converges to
the upper limit of the value function. 
Appendix A. Auxiliary results
Lemma A.1. Consider bounded stopping times S ≤ T and let x : [S, T ] 7→ R be continuous,
adapted, and of finite variation. Then for any ε > 0 there exists an adapted process θε that
is continuous and of finite variation on [S, T ] such that there exists a strong solution to
dXεt = w(t, Xt){dBt + dθεt}
with XεS = x(S) for a given w : [0, 1]× R→ (0,∞) ∈ C1,2 . Moreover, Xε satisfies
sup
r∈[S,T ]
|Xεr − x(r)| < ε.
Proof. Define y(t) := Kw(t, x(t)) and observe that y is continuous and of finite variation.
Moreover, introduce the stochastic process U δ with U δS = 0 and
dU δt = dBt +
(
1
U δt + δ
1[Uδt≤0] −
1
δ − U δt
1[Uδt>0]
)
dt,
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which stays in (−δ, δ) in view of Proposition 3.1 in [7].
Next define Rδ := U δ + y on [S, T ] and set Xδt = K
−1
w (t, R
δ
t ). Thus,
dXδt = w(t, X
δ
t )
{
dBt + dθ
δ
t
}
,
where
dθδt =
(
G(t,K−1w (t, R
δ
t )) +
1
U δt + δ
1[Uδt ≤0] −
1
δ − U δt
1[Uδt >0]
)
dt+ dyt,
where G(t, x) :=
∫ x
0
g(t, y)dy. Therefore,
sup
t∈[S,T ]
|y(t)−Kw(t, Xδt )| < δ. (A.1)
Choosing δ small enough we thus obtain
sup
t∈[S,T ]
|x(t)−Xδt | = sup
t∈[S,T ]
|K−1w (t, y(t))−Xδt )| < ε.
due to the uniform continuity of K−1w on compacts. 
Lemma A.2. Let g : [0, 1] × R¯ → R¯ be continuous such that g : [0, 1] × R → R is also
continuous. Suppose that limu→∞ g(t, u) ≥ 0 and limu→−∞ g(t, u) ≥ 0 for every t ∈ [0, 1].
Then g is bounded from below.
Proof. Consider sets (En)n≥1
En := {(t, u) ∈ [0, 1]× R : g(t, u) ≤ −n}.
Clearly, Ans are closed. They are also bounded. Indeed, if there exists a sequence (tm, um) ∈
An such that um → ∞ or um → −∞. Then, limm→∞ g(tm, um) ≤ −n, contradicting the
hypotheses on joint continuity and the limits at ±∞. Thus, Ans are compact. Therefore,
if all Ans are non-empty, then ∩n≥1An 6= ∅ by the nested set property (see Corollary to
Theorem 2.36 in [21]). By construction g(t, u) = −∞ for any (t, u) in this intersection,
which contradicts our continuity assumption on g, Therefore, An must be empty for all
n > N for some N . 
Proof of Theorem 3.3. First observe thatH∗ can be taken equal to identity in view of Remark
3.2. Let ν := inf{t ≥ 0 : ∆Xt > 0} and suppose P 0,z(ν < 1) > 0. We will construct a
strategy θε that agrees with θ∗ on [0, ν). Let ε > 0 and choose ε(ν) = ε ∧ 1−ν
3
.
On [ν, ν+ε(ν)] setXεν = X
∗
ν−, dθ
ε = −dBt+ f(z)−Xενε(ν)w(t,Xεt )dt and note that |X
ε| ≤ |X∗ν−|+|f(z)|
on [ν, ν + ε(ν)] as well as Xεν+ε(ν) = f(z).
Now consider the interval [ν + ε(ν), ν + 2ε(ν)] and introduce
dRεt = dBt +
R∗t − Rεt
ν + 2ε(ν)− tdt,
with Rεν+ε(ν) = Kw(ν + ε(ν), f(z)). It is easy to see that the solution to the above SDE on
[ν + ε(ν), ν + 2ε(ν)) is given by
Rεt = (ν + 2ε(ν)− t)
[
Rεν+ε(ν) +
∫ t
ν+ε(ν)
1
ν + 2ε(ν)− sdBs +
∫ t
ν+ε(ν)
R∗s
(ν + 2ε(ν)− s)2ds
]
,
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by (ν + 2ε(ν) − t) converge two 0 as t → ν + 2ε(ν) in view of Exercise IX.2.12 in [20].
Moreover, on [R∗ν+2ε(ν) 6= 0] an application of L’Hospital’s rule shows that the third term
multiplied by (ν + 2ε(ν) − t) converges to R∗(ν+2ε(ν))−. Similarly, on [R∗(ν+2ε(ν))− = 0], (ν +
2ε(ν) − t) ∫ t
ν+ε(ν)
|R∗s |
(ν+2ε(ν)−s)2
ds → 0. Therefore, Rεν+2ε(ν) = R∗(ν+2ε(ν))−, a.s.. Note that if we
define
τR := inf{t ≥ ν+ε(ν) : sgn(R∗t −Rεt ) 6= sgn(R∗ν+ε(ν)−Rεν+ε(ν))}∧ inf{t ≥ ν+ε(ν) : R∗t = Rεt},
where sgn(x) = 1x>0 − 1x≤0, then Rε is a semimartingale on [ν + ε(ν), τR]. Indeed,∫ τR
ν+ε(ν)
|R∗t − Rεt |
(ν + 2ε(ν)− t)dt =
∣∣∣∣
∫ τR
ν+ε(ν)
R∗t − Rεt
(ν + 2ε(ν)− t)dt
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣BτR − RετR − Bν+ε(ν) +Rεν+ε(ν)∣∣ <∞.
Next we define X˜t = K
−1
w (t, R
ε
t ) for t ∈ [ν + ε(ν), ν + 2ε(ν)) and set
Xεt =
{
f(z) + (X˜t − f(z))+, if X∗ν+ε(ν) ≥ f(z);
f(z)− (X˜t − f(z))−, if X∗ν+ε(ν) < f(z),
∀t ∈ [ν + ε(ν), τ),
where
τ = inf{t ≥ ν+ε(ν) : X∗t = f(z)}∧inf{t ≥ ν+ε(ν) : sgn(X∗t−f(z)) 6= sgn(X∗ν+ε(ν)−f(z))}∧τR.
Xε on [ν + ε(ν), τ) satisfies
dXεt = w(t, X
ε
t )(dBt + dθ
ε
t ),
where in case X∗ν+ε(ν) ≥ f(z)
dθεt = 1[Xεt>f(z)]
(
G(t, Xεt ) +
R∗t − Rεt
ν + 2ε(ν)− t
)
dt+
1
2
dL˜t − 1[Xεt=f(z)]dBt,
and L˜ is the local time of X˜ at f(z) in view of Theorem 68 in Chap. IV of [19]. Similarly,
if X∗ν+ε(ν) < f(z),
dθεt = 1[Xεt<f(z)]
(
G(t, Xεt ) +
R∗t −Rεt
ν + 2ε(ν)− t
)
dt− 1
2
dL˜t − 1[Xεt=f(z)]dBt.
Next pick an n ≥ 1 and consider θˆ, which is given by
θˆt = 1[t<ν]θ
∗
t + 1[t≥ν]
(
θ∗t 1[X∗ν−>n] + θ
ε
t1[X∗ν−≤n]
)
.
This strategy is clearly admissible and will outperform θ∗ for small enough ε and large
enough n by following the reasoning and calculations that led to the analogous conclusion
in Theorem 3.4. 
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